"In response to the question, 'Is the Darfur conflict genocide?' [,]
if we strictly apply the provisions of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, there is no
doubt that the answer is yes." (Justice Africa [UK], June 18, 2004]
Eric Reeves
June 21, 2004
Justice Africa (UK) has produced regular analyses of the "Prospects for
Peace in Sudan" for a number of years. Though occasionally misguided in
assessing US Sudan policy and politics, the organization has some of the
world's strongest Sudan research capacity, especially on northern Sudan.
In speaking on June 18, 2004 to the question of whether Khartoum's
conduct of war in Darfur constitutes genocide, Justice Africa declared
unambiguously, explicitly referencing the 1948 UN Genocide Convention;
"there is no doubt that the answer is yes"
("Sudan: Justice Africa Analysis,"
http://allafrica.com/stories/200406180714.html).
Contrary to the claims of some nongovernmental organizations, a few
weakly informed newspaper editorials, and the most recent press release
from the John Kerry presidential campaign, a determination concerning
genocide in Darfur is of very considerable significance---morally,
politically, and legally (particularly given the obligations of the
various contracting parties to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, including the US).
For it is clear that effective UN Security Council action concerning the
crisis in Darfur---in particular the authorization of humanitarian
intervention to save hundreds of thousands of lives acutely at risk---is
already far overdue, and is daily less likely. Since the only
alternative is multilateral humanitarian intervention without UN
auspices, such intervention must have some clearly established basis in
international law and treaty.
Certainly the question here can't be about the urgent necessity of such
humanitarian intervention, which must provide immediate protection to
over 1.3 million displaced civilian persons in Darfur and the Chad
border area, especially those in concentrations camps. Intervention
must also secure adequate transport capacity and corridors for urgently
needed food, in massive quantities, as well as medical supplies. The
number of war-affected persons is 2.2 million and growing. Shelter
materials, water purification, and other humanitarian materials are also
in desperately short supply. This will be a large and difficult
undertaking, and will require a substantial commitment of military
protection forces.
Given the political realities that have followed in the wake of the US
war in Iraq, and the shameful moral inertia of the UN Security Council,
it is simply wrong to suggest that a finding on the question of genocide
is inconsequential or inappropriately timed. On the contrary, it is
distinctly the most credible and urgent basis for the humanitarian
intervention that has heretofore been only implicitly recognized in
calls for UN authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (this is
the basis for forceful UN military intervention). To ignore such
conspicuous political realities reflects either a deep misunderstanding
of the nature of the Darfur crisis or internal institutional and
organizational politics---or sheer moral diffidence.
Certainly Kofi Annan's declaration of June 17, 2004 that he had seen no
report that suggested to him that the realities in Darfur reflect either
genocide or "ethnic cleansing" is a perfect illustration. Annan is
either ignorant or capitulating before UN Security Council politics or
expediently maneuvering to avoid blame. Here it should be said that UN
responsibility must be shared, not only by Annan and a Security Council
that refuses to act in meaningful fashion, but by those in the
international organization that have perversely underestimated the
extent of the crisis (the UN High Commission for Refugees in Chad comes
immediately to mind), as well as other UN political figures in New York
headquarters. Kieran Prendergast, United Nations Under-secretary for
Political Affairs and Kofi Annan's political first-in-command, has been
witheringly destructive of possible UN action behind the scenes in New
York.
This professional pessimist, like his UK partner in acquiesce Alan
Goulty, refuses to countenance even discussion of humanitarian
intervention. Prendergast claims the world isn't ready for such
intervention, even as such pronouncements of course make appropriate
action less likely. Goulty (UK special Sudan envoy) has callously
declared: "[Humanitarian intervention in Darfur] would be very
expensive, fraught with difficulties and hard to set up in a hurry" (The
Telegraph [UK], May 31, 2004)---as if the difficulty of intervention
trumped the moral obligations to prevent genocide.
Moreover, various UN Security Council members are behaving with primary
interests in Sudan that are clearly not the people of Darfur. As yet
another superbly detailed and informed Washington Post editorial
suggests ("As Genocide Unfolds," June 20, 2004):
"China and France both have oil investments in Sudan and do not wish to
alienate the government; Russia and some non-permanent members of the
Security Council such as Pakistan view a [robust UN] resolution as an
infringement of sovereignty. In ordinary times, the United States might
be able to prod these countries in the right direction. But the Bush
administration is devoting its very limited diplomatic capital to Iraq,
and there is little left for Darfur. That is why the UN resolution may
take weeks." (Washington Post, June 20, 2004)
But Darfur doesn't have weeks, not with the full rainy season beginning,
overland transport capacity already severely curtailed, and Khartoum
continuing to impede humanitarian access. Hundreds of civilians are now
dying daily, as the effects of acute malnutrition, especially among
children, begin to bite deeper into the displaced populations of
displaced (see below). At least 80,000 have already died, and
conditions by all accounts continue to deteriorate rapidly, with grossly
inadequate pre-positioned food and medical supplies. Water-borne
diseases are now beginning to explode in the camps, which will soon be
awash in human excrement.
This is a moment that requires strong international leadership. US
Secretary of State Colin Powell declared on June 11, 2004 that the US is
already engaged in a legal determination of whether what is now
officially described as "ethnic cleansing" rises to the level of
genocide (New York Times, June 12, 2004). But ten days later there has
been no further announcement other than that the legal determination is
continuing. Given the extreme urgency of the situation, and the rising
daily mortality rate, this is already too long. The legal issues have
been vetted before, and the factual evidence is all too comprehensive.
A determination of genocide cannot be withheld for political
reasons---to ascertain, for example, where UN political chips may fall.
This, of all legal determinations, must be made strictly on its
merits---and in the very near term.
But this is also a moment for the campaign of Senator John Kerry to
demonstrate leadership, and to give American voters and the world as a
whole a sense of how the senator would respond as president to an urgent
international crisis. Yesterday's press release (June 20, 2004)
continues a Kerry policy on Darfur of excessive caution, even
disingenuousness. The release declared: "Now is not the time to debate
whether to call this catastrophe a genocide. Now is the time for swift
and strong action."
But again, given the political context for any decision concerning
humanitarian intervention, and given the overwhelming evidence at hand,
now is precisely the time to make a determination about genocide. The
Kerry campaign must know how unlikely UN action is: would Senator Kerry
as President be prepared to act without UN authorization? At the very
least Senator Kerry must declare whether he would be prepared to act
under the obligations of Article 1 of the Genocide Convention to
"prevent genocide," which of course would not require a determination
that genocide is actually occurring, but only that it is clearly
threatened. Nothing has been articulated that confronts the real
difficulties of US leadership in this difficult international political
situation.
The Kerry campaign does speak of the need to "be ready to take
additional measures to pressure the Sudanese government," but without
specifying what these "additional measures" are. The Khartoum regime is
thoroughly familiar with such vague and typically empty threats. This
does nothing to help the people of Darfur, however well it may
politically position candidate Kerry on this issue.
Darfur is not, of course, an exclusively American or UN responsibility.
The countries of the European Union and Canada have so far been largely
worthless in moving toward decisive action to save hundreds of thousands
of lives; indeed, Great Britain has done a great deal to retard such
movement.
*********
How does such political failure play out in the context of current
military developments in Darfur? The answer could hardly be more grim.
For while some may be encouraged by yesterday's widely reported
announcement from National Islamic Front president Omer Beshir,
declaring in Khartoum that the regime's army will now engage in a
campaign to disarm the Janjaweed militias, closer consideration gives
reason for deep concern:
"President Omar el-Bashir said in a statement Saturday said he was
ordering a 'complete mobilization' of all Sudanese army and security
forces to disarm all Darfur's warring parties, including the
janjaweed---nomadic Arab militia that the government has been accused of
supporting." (Associated Press, June 20, 2004)
But for months the Janjaweed have been increasingly incorporated into or
moved within the ambit of Khartoum's regular forces in Darfur (this has
been reported by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the US State
Department, the International Crisis Group, and many others). The
Janjaweed have been armed by Khartoum, protected by Khartoum, given
uniforms and provisions by Khartoum, and taken orders from Khartoum.
For its part, the Janjaweed have been the primary instrument of human
destruction. Are we to believe that this will change with a simple
pronouncement, under duress, by Beshir?
Let us recall that it was Beshir who in early February 2004 shamelessly
lied about Darfur, brazenly declaring that the military situation was
"fully under control." Months of intervening military violence, directed
primarily against civilians, proves how profound Beshir's lie was.
As a further measure of the integrity of pronouncements from Khartoum on
the military state of affairs in Darfur, we should recall recent
pronouncements from NIF Vice President Ali Osman Taha:
"Taha accused the international media of deliberately magnifying the
scale of the humanitarian problem in the region. He also claimed that
the conflict was fabricated by the West." (Agence France-Presse
[Cairo], June 16, 2004)]
This regime lies repeatedly, shamelessly, egregiously---and without
consequence. Why, then, should it not lie now and simply say what the
international community wishes to hear---and thereby be relieved from
any responsibility to act meaningfully? But more than simply a lie,
Beshir's statement is almost certainly an effort to conceal a major new
offensive in Darfur. This would be a full-scale response to realities
reflected in a much less widely reported statement yesterday from one of
the two main insurgency movements in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (unrelated to the southern SPLM/A):
"One of the two main rebel groups in Sudan's western region of Darfur
said on Sunday it had extended its control to areas abandoned by
government forces since a cease-fire agreement signed in April. The
official of the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), who asked not to
be named because he is based in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, said the
movement had armed and trained new supporters in areas previously
outside its control.
"'There are areas in which there is no government presence but in which
we have supporters, so we have moved in to provide protection for these
supporters,' he told Reuters. 'The areas include Geraida and Labadu
towns in South Darfur state and Kurma and Shingul Tubay in North
Darfur.'
"The government says the April 8 cease-fire banned moving forces into
new areas and that the aim of a government campaign to disarm the rebels
is to restore the April status quo. The SLM official, denying it was
violating the truce, said the group was partly responding to government
forces activities.
"'We are not moving forces. People are joining up because of what the
government is doing to them. We are only arming and training them and
they are establishing garrisons in their villages and towns.' He said
about 300 villagers joined up his group after government forces bombed
Tabit in Northern Darfur state, enabling the SLM to take control of
Shingul Tubay." (Reuters, June 20, 2004)
Since Khartoum's continued use of its aerial military assets after the
April 8 cease-fire has been repeatedly confirmed, and since bombing
efforts are so often associated with continuing Janjaweed attacks on
villages, it is hardly surprising that the insurgency campaign is
strengthening in isolated and threatened rural areas. These
consolidations of military resistance, not the Janjaweed, will be the
real targets of Beshir's "complete mobilization of all Sudanese army and
security forces." Indeed, this offensive will certainly make full and
brutal use of the Janjaweed militia allies. As the authoritative
Justice Africa noted in its recent analysis, the campaign in Darfur is
distinguished by the "ruthlessness with which the security elite at the
heart of the Government of Sudan have operated, and their readiness to
turn Darfur into an ethics-free zone" ("Sudan: Justice Africa Analysis,"
http://allafrica.com/stories/200406180714.html).
Since the only force presently monitoring the merely notional April 8,
2004 cease-fire (long since in tatters) is a very small group of African
Union monitors, there is nothing to prevent Khartoum from following such
a strategy in the vast majority of Darfur (an area the size of France)
that remains inaccessible to international humanitarian workers, news
reporters, and the monitoring force itself. Inexcusably, the
international community seems content with this absurdly small force,
which will grow to only 120, and this only by the end of July. It is
completely inadequate to the task at hand, a mere fig-leaf for absence
of meaningful monitoring. (Today's EU announcement that it may send 6-9
observers [Reuters, June 21, 2004] does nothing to change this picture
of absurd inadequacy.)
Unsurprisingly, the most recent fact sheet from the US Agency for
International Development "Darfur---Humanitarian Emergency" (June 18,
2004) chronicles the military violence that has been continuing even
before Beshir's announcement:
"In north Darfur, during the week of June 14, the UN reported clashes
involving the Jingaweit militias and the SLM/A, in particular west of El
Fasher [capital of North Darfur]. Ongoing attacks and harassment of
civilians have also been reported in Debatuga, Senahaye, and El Halif.
Clashes between the Jingaweit and the SLM/A were also reported south of
El Fasher along the road to Nyala [capital of South Darfur]."
"According to UN reports, increasing fighting in South Darfur from June
10 to 16 has resulted in higher numbers of Internally Displaced Persons.
Jingaweit militia attacks were reported in at least 18 villages between
8 and 45 kilometers northwest of Nyala, and near Mallam."
(Fact Sheet #10 from the US Agency for International Development
"Darfur---Humanitarian Emergency," June 18, 2004)
These are obviously extremely limited views of the ongoing violence in
Darfur, into which Khartoum has now justified the intrusion of
large-scale activities by its regular military forces, which had been at
least partially constrained previously by the April 8 cease-fire. All
that can halt this continuing violence, and allow for civilians to feel
some measure of security, is humanitarian intervention that includes a
large and robust military force.
*************
In ways that have been predicted now for months, the humanitarian
situation continues to deteriorate rapidly. This is largely because of
Khartoum's past and ongoing deliberate impeding of humanitarian access.
Humanitarian and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to
be confronted by delays and a determined policy of obstructionism on
Khartoum's part:
"NGOs continue to face delays in obtaining visas for their international
technical staff. Some NGO staff members have been waiting for more than
eight weeks for visas without any progress. [The US Agency for
International Development] is concerned that this problem continues to
undermine NGO capacity and hamper the international community's ability
to meet the needs of Internally Displaced Persons throughout Darfur."
(Fact Sheet #10 from the US Agency for International Development
"Darfur---Humanitarian Emergency," June 18, 2004)
The failure of the international humanitarian community to surmount
Khartoum's obstructionism is noted with deep frustration in a press
release today (June 21, 2004) from Doctors Without Borders/ Médecins
Sans Frontières (MSF), Paris/Khartoum:
"[Darfur's] displaced have been entirely dependent on external aid for
several months, but the assistance necessary for them to survive has not
materialized. Already, 200 people die in Mornay every month, and there
is nothing to indicate that assistance will arrive in time or in
sufficient quantities to avoid a massive human catastrophe."
A present mortality rate of 200 per month in the Mornay camp alone---and
this is a camp with "humanitarian access." There are now scores of
camps, most without humanitarian access; the latter have become de facto
concentration camps, defined by imprisonment and extermination through
starvation and lack of water and sanitary facilities. The aggregate
daily mortality rate for all of Darfur is now almost certainly in excess
of 500 human beings, highly disproportionately children. Moreover, as
MSF reports, even in camps for the displaced where there is "access,"
the risks to civilians remain inordinate:
"The same militias who carried out the initial attacks now control the
camp's periphery, virtually imprisoning people who live in constant
fear. Men risk being killed if they leave, and women have been beaten
and raped looking for food and other essential items outside the camp.
In the past nine weeks, MSF medical teams have treated 132 victims of
such violence."
(Press release from Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF), June 21, 2004 [Paris/Khartoum])
This is a glimpse from a camp with humanitarian "access"; for an
understanding of how much worse conditions are in camps without
"access," see analysis of the Kailek concentration camp by this writer
("African Auschwitz: The Concentration Camps of Darfur," May 12, 2004;
available upon request).
Nutritional surveys completed by other humanitarian organizations with
some access in Darfur continue to report shockingly high and growing
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM)
rates. For example in the Abu Shouk camp for Internally Displaced
Persons in North Darfur, the GAM is 39% and the SAM is 10% (a GAM rate
of 15% is considered the "emergency threshold"; approximately a third of
all those in the SAM category will die). (Fact Sheet #10 from the US
Agency for International Development "Darfur---Humanitarian Emergency,"
June 18, 2004)
*************
With remorseless logic, Darfur's genocide continues to accomplish
itself---hidden by euphemism, diffidence, callous "Realpolitik," and
unforgivable ignorance. The mortality rate will soon reach to 1,000
innocent human beings per day, and will continue to soar, reaching in
excess of 4,000 per day by December. The robust humanitarian
intervention that can mitigate this massive human destruction is nowhere
in sight, and indeed seems only to recede as a politically and
logistically viable enterprise.
Eventually those who now say that a genocide determination does not
matter will be right. The dying will at long last end, with perhaps a
million or more dead from famine, disease, and violence. For the dead
and the bereft, calling it genocide or an "accident of history" will not
matter---not in the slightest. At this future moment, such a
"determination" will matter only as a means for history to remind us how
badly we failed, again, in refusing to confront genocide honestly.
Eric Reeves
Smith College
